Reflections on Human
Personhood:
Establishing a Framework
By J. P. Moreland and Scott
B. Rae
Throughout the centuries
Christians have believed that each human
person
consists in a soul and body;
that the soul survived the death of the
body;
and that its future life will
be immortal.1
H.D. LEWIS
In terms of biblical
psychology, man does not have a “soul,”
he is one.
He is a living and vital
whole. It is possible to distinguish between his
activities,
but we cannot distinguish
between the parts,
for they have no independent
existence.2
J.K. HOWARD
How should
we think about human persons? What sorts of
things,
fundamentally, are they? What is it to be a
human, what is it to be a human
person, and
how should we think about personhood? . .
.
The first
point to note is that on the Christian scheme of
things,
God is the
premier person, the first and chief exemplar of
personhood . . .
and the
properties most important for an understanding of our
personhood
are
properties we share with him.3
ALVIN
PLANTINGA
IT IS SAFE TO SAY THAT
THROUGHOUT HUMAN HISTORY, THE VAST majority of
people, educated and uneducated alike, have been
dualists, at least in the sense
that they have taken a human to be the sort of being
that could enter life after
death while one’s corpse was left
behind—for example, one could enter life after
death as the very same individual or as some sort of
spiritual entity that merges
with the All.
Some form of dualism appears
to be the natural response to what we seem to
know about ourselves through introspection and in
other ways. Many philosophers
who deny dualism admit that it is the commonsense
view. When we turn to an
investigation of church history, we see the same
thing. For two thousand years, the
vast majority of Christian thinkers have believed in
the souls of men and beasts, as
it used to be put. Animals and humans are composed of
an immaterial entity—a
soul, a life principle, a ground of
sentience—and a body. More specifically, a
human
being is a unity of two distinct entities—body
and soul. The human soul, while not by nature
immortal, is capable of entering an intermediate
disembodied state upon
death, however incomplete and unnatural this state
may be, and of eventually being
reunited with a resurrected body. Augustine says,
“But the soul is present as a
whole not only in the entire mass of a body, but also
in every least part of the body
at the same time.”4 Similarly, Thomas Aquinas
claims “we now proceed to treat of
man, who is composed of a spiritual and corporeal
substance.” 5 Today, things
have changed. For many, the rise of modern science
has called into question the
viability of dualism. In popular and intellectual
cultures alike, many argue that
neurophysiology demonstrates the radical dependence
and, in fact, identity between
mind and brain, that genetics has shown genes and DNA
are all that are needed to
explain the development of living things, that
advances in artificial intelligence make
likely the suggestion that humans are just
complicated computers and that cloning seems to
reduce us to mere structured aggregates of physical
parts. Interestingly,
among contemporary Christian intellectuals there is a
widespread loathing for
dualism as well. We are often told that biblical
revelation depicts the human person
as a holistic unity whereas dualism is a Greek
concept falsely read into the Bible by
many throughout the history of the church.
Christians, we are told, are committed
to monism and the resurrection of the body, not to
dualism and the immortality of
the soul. In short, dualism is outdated, unbiblical
and incorrect.
Concurrent with the alleged
demise of dualism is the rise of advanced medical
technologies that have made prominent a number of
very important and difficult
issues about ethics at both edges of life. Central to
these issues are questions about
the nature of human personhood, about the reality of
life after death and about the
existence, nature, accessibility and degree of
justification of ethical or religious
knowledge as compared to scientific knowledge. It is
not too dramatic to say that
we are facing a contemporary crisis in ethics, a
crisis that has lead to a good deal of
moral confusion, chaos and
fragmentation.
In our opinion the
concurrence of the demise of dualism (specifically a
Christian
form of dualism) and the ethical and religious crisis
just mentioned is no accident.
We believe that what is needed is a more careful
formulation and defense of
Christian dualism—a defense that renders
intelligible a solid Christian anthropology
and that shows the relative importance and specific
roles science, theology and
philosophy have in the integrative task of developing
a model of human personhood
that is adequate to what we know or justifiably
believe from all the relevant disciplines. Such a
task requires a multidisciplinary effort, and even if
we were able to
take on such a work (which we are not), a fully
developed Christian anthropology
would be impossible to complete in a single volume.
Given these limitations, we
shall offer what we hope will be an adequate defense
of the most reasonable and
biblically accurate depiction of human personhood,
and we hope to relate that
depiction to crucial ethical concerns that affect us
all. This task is important for
some of the reasons just mentioned. But it is also
relevant because of the general
human curiosity and angst about what persons are and
wherein lies their destiny. As
Blaise Pascal once put it, “The immortality of
the soul is something of such vital
importance to us, affecting us so deeply, that one
must have lost all feeling not to
care about knowing the facts of the matter.”6
In this chapter we shall look
at a taxonomy of versions of dualism, investigate the
Christian understanding of a human person as it has
been traditionally conceived
and discuss the broad contours of what a proper
approach to human personhood
should look like.
What Is Dualism?
As does any broad
philosophical and theological notion, dualism comes
in several
varieties. At its root, dualism simply means
“two-ism,” and it expresses a
commitment to the proposition that two items in
question are, in fact, two different
entities or kinds of entities instead of being
identical to one another.
Cosmic dualism is the
view that reality in general is composed of two
different
entities (e.g., individuals, properties, realms of
reality) that cannot be reduced to
each other. Cosmic dualists sometimes go beyond this
and accept the claim either
that these two entities are both metaphysically
ultimate—that is, one did not come
from or is not dependent on the other for its
existence—or that one entity is inferior
in value to the other. For example, Zoroastrianism
teaches that Ahura-Mazda (the
good, wise Lord) and Angra Mainyu (the spirit of
evil) are opposites locked in a
cosmic struggle between good and evil. In Taoism the
yin and the yang are bipolar
forces (good-evil, male-female, light-dark, etc.)
that constantly react to and with
each other in governing all of reality. Gnostic
dualism implies that spirit and matter
are different and that the latter is of little value
compared to the former. Is
Christianity a form of cosmic dualism? The answer is
no and yes.
Christianity does not affirm
that there are two ultimate, independent realities.
Everything besides God owes its existence to him in
some way or another. Nor
does Christianity teach that spirit is good and
matter is evil. Yet there are clear
cosmic dualities presupposed by and taught in Holy
Scripture: God-creation, good-evil, truth-falsity,
immaterial-material world, being-becoming and, we
believe, soul-body. In addition to cosmic dualisms,
there are various forms of dualism regarding
the constitution of human persons (and animals,
though we will focus here only on
human persons). These anthropological dualisms
may be divided into three
categories: metaphysical, eschatological and
axiological. Let us take these in
order.
Metaphysical. The
metaphysical category of anthropological dualism
centers on the
question of the constitutional nature of human
persons. This version of dualism is
the chief focus of this book. Property-event
dualism is the idea that mental and
physical properties or events are genuinely different
kinds of entities. Thoughts,
sensations, beliefs, desires, volitions and so on are
mental events in which mental
properties are embedded (e.g., they have
intentionality—the property of being of or
about something —or the property of being
self-presenting); various brain events
with physical properties are nonidentical to mental
events. The rival to property-event dualism (indeed,
to any form of anthropological dualism) is strict
physicalism,
or monism, the view that all properties,
events, relations, individuals and so on are
strictly physical entities. Monists believe that
there may be an irreducible duality of
language: for example, an event that is caused by a
pin stick can be described by
the two nonsynonymous terms pain and C
fiber firing pattern. Nevertheless,
monists insist that these two terms have the same
referent and that the referent is
a physical state.
Substance dualism is the view
that the soul—I, self, mind—is an
immaterial
substance different from the body to which it is
related. In order to adequately
understand substance dualism, one must get clear on
the nature of a substance,
and we shall look at this topic in chapter two. But
for now, suffice it to say that the
substance dualist is committed to the claim that the
soul is an immaterial entity that
could, in principle, survive death and ground
personal identity in the afterlife.
Two major variants of
substa